

A Brief Timeline of Socialist Construction in China, and the Lessons of the GPCR

Foreword

Since the revisionist coup of October 6, 1976, International Communist Movement lost its most important revolutionary base since the loss of Soviet Union. The subsequent revisionist counterattack in China and around the world attempted to further push back the revolutionary force. While facing the temporary setbacks, the heroic sons and daughters of the world proletarian and oppressed people still raised the banner bravely with the four people's wars that lasted until today: Peru, Turkey, India, and the Philippines. The parties leading these people's wars are with no exception born from the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, who directly forged the parties, and many more around the world, with the highest development of Marxism, enriched with countless experiences and great revolutionary enthusiasm.

But 58 years since its initiation, GPCR is quite understudied compared to its importance. The complex situation left us with only few good summation of its history, and rarely any archive we can learn from. What is more, the lessons we could have learned from the line struggle against Lin Biao and Deng Xiaoping, two of the most vicious and die-hard revisionist clique the Chinese people have seen, are largely untouched. It is our will that these historical lessons must be recovered, and circulated around, for they educate and reaffirm us our urgent task of reconstituting militarized communist parties and preparing for the initiation of people's war, and the Marxist principles we must uphold in this process.

We want to pay our respect to all revolutionaries and communists who have undertaken such task of summarizing the experience and history of GPCR. It is worth mentioning that the Peruvian comrades, despite all the difficulties they could have encountered, produced several simple yet accurate articles and speeches, correctly framing the history of line struggle during GPCR, while correctly identifying the character of each line. These articles and speeches are accessible in English, and greatly enriched our understanding in the first place. We also want to apologize to all readers, that we are unable to keep track of a list of footnote because of the variety and technical issues with the source we referred to in writing this article. Still, we hope that this article helps deepen the understanding of the history of line struggles in Socialist China, particularly during GPCR for all of our readers.

I. 17 Years of Socialist Construction

In 1949, over 28 years of fierce and resolute struggle, Chinese communists, under the leadership of the great Chairman Mao, liberated Chinese people from semi-feudalism, bureaucratic capitalism, and imperialism from Kuomintang. With the victory of new democratic revolution, the Communist Party of China marched incessantly towards Socialist Revolution. Chairman Mao, during the process of socialist construction, raised high the Three Red Flags: the general line of building socialism, the Great Leap Forward, and the People's Commune. In the period of 13 years, Chinese people, with their unforeseen enthusiasm and the leadership of the Communist Party, developed a basic but independent industrial system, collectivized agricultural production, and a thriving socialist culture. Old China is gone, and New China is built.

Yet the old thing will not disappear by itself, and as socialist construction develops, a black line formulated. Over time, this line is represented by different figures. Yet the different attacks launched by different figures always bear two goals: one, to repudiate the left line and Chairman Mao, and replace it with their rightist line; two, to remove Chairman Mao from power with any means possible. In general, this line seeks to distort the left line, and smuggle their revisionism and capitalism instead.

Immediately after the founding of People's Republic of China, Liu Shaoqi stages an attack in the

economic field. He claimed, in order to consolidate the economy devastated by the Civil War, the Party must make concession to the national bourgeoisie. This line seeks to surrender control of national economy to the bourgeoisie, which develops under the slogan “consolidate new democratic order” and “the four freedom”. In the countryside, Liu attacks the forming of co-operatives, calling this act “adventurist”. In the city, Liu makes concession to capitalists, spreading a distorted belief that “exploitation is good” because China is an underdeveloped agricultural country, and needs a mature capitalism first. To combat Liu’s line, Chairman Mao leads the co-operative movement. He drafted the Resolution on Mutual Aid and Co-operative in Agriculture in 1951, which served as a plan and blueprint for the development of co-operative from lower to higher stage. By 1953, the Resolution is formalized as the Party’s line on constructing socialist agriculture. At the same time, to repudiate Liu’s bourgeois line, Chairman Mao pointed out that, despite the claim to consolidate the regime by Liu, the transitional period from capitalism to communism is to be filled with contradictions and struggles. Consolidation is the view of stopping at one certain stage, which in practice becomes rightism which builds not socialism, but capitalism. The struggle concludes around the end of 1953, where the Chairman Mao’s line of developing co-operatives, and developing national and collective ownership prevails over Liu’s line of developing capitalism freely.

As the left struggle against Liu’s line, Gao Gang and Rao Shushi, two prominent regional bureau leaders who are promoted to the Central in 1953, stages a “left” sectarian attack on the Party. Gao and Rao preaches the “military party” theory, placing the army as the creator of the party, and seeks to organize the “red base party” against the “party in white areas”. In fact, the method they applied are forming secret cliques and promising promotion to sway people, which violates the democratic centralism and discipline of the Party. They used the time where the left was busy struggling against Liu Shaoqi’s rightist line to disguise themselves as part of the left, and used their power at various meetings to find themselves allies. Gao and Rao, while aiming their attack at Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai, are in essence trying to attack the Central as a whole, and seize power for themselves. The attack is ultimately concerted at Chairman Mao, who is the leading figure in the Central, and make them the faction with the most power and voice. This line is dealt first at the politburo meeting of December, 1953, where Chairman Mao gives a soft warning to comrades who committed sectarian mistake with the draft Resolution on Strengthening Party Unity. The Resolution is passed at the Fourth Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee, which also bring forth a criticism and self-criticism campaign to help comrades being deceived by Gao and Rao. Gao Gang, in rejection to criticism and self-criticism, committed suicide as his last act against Chairman Mao’s line. Gao and Rao is condemned at the national representative congress of 1955. In addition to the struggle against Gao Gang, there is another thing we need draw attention to: both Peng Dehuai and Lin Biao are involved in Gao’s faction in various degree.

The struggle against Gao and Rao is in fact defeating an underway coup within the Central Committee. Following the struggle, the Party reinforced unity and strengthened the left line. In response to the advancement the left made, the bourgeoisie launched an attack coordinated both within and out of the Party. Under the Rectification Movement of 1957, various bourgeois authorities criticized harshly the policy and line of the CPCh, confusing the dictatorship of the proletariat with bureaucratism and secretarianism. The bourgeois figures in the party also sponsored the attack, yet simultaneously hiding themselves by taking a step back from the struggle. While the attack by bourgeois authority is crushed, the tactic the bourgeoisie played is the first show of “sacrificing a pawn to save the marshal”, which they shall apply repeatedly to conserve their forces in later struggles.

The launch of Great Leap Forward in 1958 is another landmark of socialist construction in China. The bourgeois figures also act viciously to distort the Three Red Flags raised by Chairman Mao. At the beginning of People’s Commune movement, Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, together with their

company, mainly Zeng Xisheng, Li Jingquan, Wu Zhipu, Shu Tong, and Zhang Zhongliang pushed for an ultra-left line comprised of egalitarianism (over-spending of resources on projects, seeking to level out all differences at a very short period of time) and commandism (ordering peasant masses to work and follow blindly the commands of higher-ups, especially in putting them to work for higher-level communes while ignoring their emotion). They rushed to form People's Commune, and pull resources for impractical projects and plans locally. At the same time, they purge all cadres, party members and the masses who dare to criticize their "left" adventurism, labeling these revolutionary elements as rightists. They tell the masses to do things according to their own subjective will, want only fancy achievements for themselves but not actually developing socialism. During the Three Years of Economic Difficulty, the provinces under their administration suffered the most damage. Even after hearing back reports from localities about famine and shortage of food, these bourgeois figures refuse to send help, rather order to struggle against those who dare to speak out the truth. The "left" disguise dealt grave damage to the people of Shandong, Anhui, Henan, Gansu, and Sichuan.

The "left" opportunism creates the condition for the right to launch another round of attack on the left. At Lushan Conference of 1959, Peng Dehuai attacked the Three Red Flags in an all-round manner. Together with Zhang Wentian and Huang Kecheng under the cover "military club", Peng denies all achievements during the Great Leap Forward by obfuscating the concrete developments in national economy with abstract terms. He then denies the necessity of putting politics in command, evaluating the main danger in the party as ultra-left tendency, treating the enthusiasm of the masses and cadres as petty-bourgeois tendency that place subjective feeling above objective conditions. In fact, he seeks to deny the necessity of mobilizing the masses to build socialism with the millions and opens the door for technicians and bourgeois experts. The attack was repudiated by Chairman Mao, who pointed out the pessimism and rightism Peng and his company are spreading, and reaffirmed the achievement in the Great Leap Forward. Removing Peng and his "military club" from the post, Lushan Conference concluded with a unified understanding that the right opportunism tendency is the main danger.

Lushan Conference defended the Party against a whirlwind staged by the bourgeois headquarter, yet it failed to expose the biggest bourgeois figure in power: Liu Shaoqi. Liu, who assumed high position within the Central Committee and in charge of party affairs, uses his power to promote his kind to key positions. They waited for an opportunity to launch a new attack on the left, which comes to reality in 1962. At the Seven Thousands Cadres Conference of 1962, Liu launched an all-round attack on the People's Commune and the Great Leap Forward. At this meeting whose goal is to summarize the experience and lesson from the Great Leap Forward and to strengthen party unity, Liu put the pressure on Chairman Mao, attacking the left line for everything. Using his relations with other bourgeois figures, Liu formed a *de facto* clique whose member collects one-sidedly negative materials about the economic condition in the past three years. At the Conference, this clique launched a coordinated attack on the leadership of the left, accusing Chairman Mao as the cause of economic difficulties with the famous saying "30 percent natural disaster, 70 percent man-made disaster". Yet let us remember, it is precisely Liu and his company performing an ultra-left line in the Great Leap Forward. What's more, after the Conference, Liu and his company at provincial level and local level worked fast to reverse collectivization effort, albeit verbally agreeing to the report at the Conference that collectivization is the Party's line on agriculture. Only one word can describe such act: hypocrisy.

With the attack on Seven Thousands Cadres Conference, Liu Shaoqi forced Chairman Mao to reside to lesser position. The right seized power from the left. With the power in their hand, Liu starts distorting rectification campaigns. Together with his wife Wang Guangmei, Liu pushes for a secretive and bureaucratic approach of investigation and rectification in the Socialist Education Movement. Liu and his company drafted 10 Points in subversion to Chairman Mao's line on the

Movement, directing the attack on rank-and-file members and lower-level cadres, while emphasize treating rich peasants and upper-middle peasants with peace. They draw a line of demarcation based on the faction formed by the rightists, and reducing the criteria for becoming a cadre to whether or not someone adhere to Liu's line. This ultra-left line in the Socialist Education Movement purged many good cadres on the local level who are loyal to the left line, and at the same time trained a handful of cadres who are at service of the bourgeois line.

While domestically Liu Shaoqi and the bourgeois headquarter work to strengthen their clique and reverse socialist construction, they also collaborate with revisionism internationally, seeking to liquidate China as the revolutionary headquarter against all trends of revisionism. Wang Jiaxiang, the minister of the International Department, raised the concern that China should reduce its aid to revolutionary and national liberation movements around the world, and be less antagonistic towards revisionist and imperialist powers due to the economic difficulty. While the left disagrees with this approach, Wang keeps pushing this line in practice, trying to mend relations with Soviet Union and approach Western imperialist powers. This line, promoting that China should maintain peace with imperialism, revisionism, and reactionary forces, and provide lesser foreign aid is in fact a replication of Khrushchev's "three peaceful and two whole".

Liu's domination of the Central and party affairs also revives bureaucratic method of work. The two years of practice of Liu's line affirmed Chairman Mao that a right, bourgeois line is in power in several departments of the Central, while poisoning locals at the same time. He repeatedly emphasized that, communists in China must be aware of class struggle, and warn against bourgeois characters, especially the bourgeois figures in power. Liu Shaoqi, while agreeing to these notions, in practice he either distort them to advance the interest of the bourgeois headquarter he represents, or rejects presenting them to a broader scale within the Party. While Liu shows a nominal respect to Chairman Mao, he opposes to all his directives. All means to convince Liu away from the bourgeois line he represents eventually end in failure.

From leading the struggle against the attack led by Gao, Peng, and Liu, studying the situation of class struggle in China, and summarizing from the experience and lessons from the Soviet Union, Chairman Mao concludes that the bourgeoisie, after their initial defeat and loss of power, returns to the political apparatuses. They seek representatives especially among the finest weapon of the proletariat – the communist party, with the task of distorting the line, and seize power. They seek to replace the vanguard of the proletariat with professional bureaucrats who serve their interest, and with them steer the direction of China to that of capitalism.

At the same time, there are still small productions and old relation of production in China. Indeed, as Lenin correctly pointed out that petty bourgeois relation of production produces capitalism, these old relations keep generating bourgeois mindset and figures that seeks to broaden these bourgeois rights, since the petty bourgeoisie always diverge and fall either into the proletariat or the bourgeoisie. The rightist lines more or less focused on ceding lands to the small production and bourgeois rights in the field of economy, as part of the attack to strengthen their rank-and-file force. In the countryside, the attack focused on granting peasantry more "independence" and restore market under the slogan "three freedom, one fix"; in the city, the attack focused on strengthening the different levels of wages that worker receives, and give worker material incentives.

With political power the bourgeois figures control, they also attempt to distort socialist education and culture to attack the Party, Marxism, and train the youth as future bourgeois figures. Struggle in the cultural and ideological field is intense. Deng Tuo and Wu han, two loyal subjects of Liu Shaoqi, attacked Great Leap Forward, and Chairman Mao's struggle against Peng Dehuai with historical reference in their work "Sanjiacun Notes" published in a Beijing local newspaper. As Chairman Mao said, "the use of novels for anti-Party activity is a great invention. Anyone wanting

to overthrow a political regime must create public opinion and do some preparatory ideological work.” These works aim precisely at this goal by sneaking their criticisms to the Party and the revolutionary line into historical essays.

During the first 17 years of socialist construction, the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie sees capitalist restoration in some fields: education, art and literature, foreign relations, and in some local industries. However, it would be incorrect to consider the first 17 years in a one-sided manner as nothing good. This is simply un-dialectical. In fields like the transformation of ownership and collectivization, there are major socialist achievements we can see. The perspective we should take is taking the first 17 years as a process of class struggle where the proletariat and the bourgeoisie contended on all fields, with successes and defeats on both sides. It is the process at which revolutionaries understand the law of socialist construction, and coming to understand the need to continue the revolution under it against the bourgeoisie and all old elements.

The two line struggle in the 17 years of socialist construction prior to the GPCR exposed the central question to resolve the line struggle and ensure proletarian leadership as the question of power, power exercised by the revolutionary masses under the leadership of the Communist Party. This is the main problem the revolutionary must resolve. Hence the importance of the GPCR, where Chairman Mao lead the two line struggle in the Party and the mass movement in struggling against bourgeois characters in power, and from the intense struggle rises the principle to continuing revolution under socialism. We also emphasize that, it is with the GPCR the left was able to seize power in the Central, which was usurped by Liu and his company in the 60s. As revolutionaries, the GPCR provided us the best lesson to both how the left struggles to maintain power and use it to defeat bourgeois figures in power, and how Maoism, as the third, new, and higher stage of Marxism resolves the question of continuing revolution against all old and bourgeois relations and their representatives under the incessant march to glorious communism.

II. Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution

We will not go over a detailed history of the GPCR in this text; rather, a timeline with lessons. Albeit the detail requires the attention of revolutionaries, it is more important that we draw the universal lessons and apply them to developing revolutionary movement, reconstituting the communist party and launch people’s war under the guide of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism to establish working class power. However, we must point out that, despite the lack of information, Chairman Gonzalo and the PCP compiled timeline and analysis correctly identifying different lines and struggles in and after the GPCR. Both “Content and Significance of the GPCR” from issue 8 of the People’s Voice, and the excerpt “China” produced 1989 provide good contexts and analysis of the GPCR. We recommend studying these two documents, and at the same time, we emphasize the principal side of grasping the lessons and experiences from the GPCR and apply them to develop revolutionary movement in our country over knowing all that had happened.

Let us begin with reiterating the question that the GPCR is trying to resolve. In the word of Chinese comrades themselves, the objective “is to struggle against and overthrow those persons in authority who are taking the capitalist road, to criticize and repudiate the reactionary bourgeois academic ‘authorities’ and the ideology of the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes and to transform education, literature and art and all other parts of the superstructure not in correspondence with the socialist economic base, so as to facilitate the consolidation and development of the socialist system.” We recap three important points: one, class struggle around the question of who controls the power; two, consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat as the goal; third, overthrowing bourgeois figure in power, and seize back the power usurped by them as the means. It is the development of socialism towards higher stages by consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat and its leadership, the communist party, and develop communist ideas and proletarian culture. It is Maoism, as the most developed stage of Marxism in our current time answering to the question of

continue waging the revolution against the bourgeoisie and all exploitative classes in history, and their ideas and culture, until the realization of classless society.

While the bourgeoisie attacks the dictatorship of the proletariat on many fronts, we must emphasize that these attacks are concerted by the bourgeois figures in power. In other words, these attacks are coordinated by a bourgeois headquarter formed within the party and state by these figures. They utilize political power they control, and use state apparatuses such as the People's Liberation Army and the militia to suppress the revolutionary masses and cadres who dare to struggle against their line. Distorting the loyalty of PLA soldiers and commanders to their reactionary program, these bourgeois figures committed multiple atrocities in 1966 to 1967, hoping to silence the uprising of the revolutionary masses with white terror. They ordered PLA soldiers open fire upon unarmed masses in Qinghai, round up revolutionary rebels and massacred them in Dao County, Hunan... They also attempted to rally the masses with the guise of revolutionary slogans to cool down the criticism against themselves. In Beijing, Liu Shaoqi and Peng Zhen responded to the decision of launching the GPCR with sending work teams to university campuses, aiming at containing the revolutionary enthusiasm of the youth and the students under their control. This method is being applied almost in every provinces, where the local bourgeois figures traffic the prestige of the Party for their own defense. As Chinese comrades noted, the chief enemy is "those in authority who have wormed their way into the Party and are taking the capitalist road." Their control of certain political power granted them the access to twist directives in their favor, while confusing the masses Yen-an With Xi'an.

The broad participation of the masses, upholding Marxism as the weapon to expose, repudiate, and overthrow the bourgeoisie and their henchmen in all fields is the means of reinforcing and exercising the dictatorship of the proletariat. The masses, upholding the right to rebel under the leadership of the revolutionary line, participated in first criticism of various bourgeois figures on the county, city, and provincial level. In response to the attempt by the bourgeois figures to contain the mass movement, several mass leaders questioned the work team, their local party units, directing attack on the black line. These criticisms are unsurprisingly turned down by the rightists in power, which only fueled the doubt of the masses about their true color, and intensified the struggle. As Chairman Mao pointed out, the masses educate themselves in the crucible of the class struggle, and the repression they faced from the revisionists are the best lesson that rallied them around Chairman Mao's revolutionary line. In Wuhan, the bourgeois figures documented revolutionary masses and plotting on retaliate when it's proper; in Shanghai and Beijing, work team in university campuses silence all opposing voice under the slogan of anti-rightists, and in factory they attacked any worker who dared to criticize the party unit. The monopolizing of voice threw many workers, some even previously supporting the bourgeois figures, to the path of revolution. The bourgeoisie and reactionaries indeed dig their own graves.

The situation of class struggle develops with the balance shift in favor of the revolutionary masses. During the "Fifty Days" starting in mid-May of 1966, the work team dispatched by Liu and Deng to schools and factories gradually lost their popularity due to them directing the struggle directly at the masses who dare to disagree with Liu and Deng's line, and applying brutal methods to suppress them. In the central, struggle on retracting the work team burst out between Chairman Mao and Liu Shaoqi. The two line struggle culminated on the eleventh plenum of the eighth central committee, where the rightist not only refused the political criticism made by the left, but also rejected organizational decision in retracting the work team. The struggle resulted in the 16-point Decision which reaffirmed the principle "it is right to rebel", pointing the subject of struggle and criticism at all bourgeois figures, but primarily the bourgeois figures in power.

The decision by the Central provided revolutionary masses across China a weapon to combat the three months of the dominance of the bourgeois reactionary line. The masses organize themselves

in organizations, upholding the decision of the Central and vowing to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat against all vile bourgeois figures. However, the bourgeois headquarter did not give up. Rather, they used what they have to rally masses around distorted slogans, equating the attack on themselves (bourgeois figures) with the attack on the Party, and campaigned to defend the “old” cadres. They use their power to grant these organizations better props, access to arm, and connection to the party. Under the bourgeois leadership, these conservative mass organizations become the tool that the revisionists fight against the revolutionary masses and the revolutionary line. The bourgeoisie switched to the “left” to fight the left line.

Despite their desperate play, the resistance of the bourgeois figures are proven to be futile. As Chairman Mao said, the correctness of the line determines everything. With a correct line, you can win everything; otherwise you will lose everything. The revolutionary masses, in the struggle against the bourgeois line, drew the line of demarcation between the red and the black. The masses that are deceived by the bourgeois line temporarily also recognizes the true color of the cadres they are protecting, who revealed that their true interest is protecting themselves and their petty interest with repeatedly rejecting and evading criticism. The false slogans backfired on itself, and in cities like Harbin, Shanghai, and Wuhan, the masses flood to the left line.

By the end of November, the balance have tipped to the left. In Shanghai, revolutionary workers founded the Revolutionary Rebel Worker’s General Headquarter, comprising of over a hundred thousand of revolutionary workers in Shanghai across different industries. They also formed a broad united front with revolutionary organizations that are comprised of students, peasants, soldiers, and cadres. Shanghai’s bourgeois representative Cao Diqu and Chen Pixian are forced to self-criticize and subject themselves to the supervision of the revolutionary masses. In a desperate attempt to strike back, they resorted to economism. Party cadres that are still loyal to the bourgeois line started pushing workers who are in favor of the old party committee to go absence on work, and the factory started giving great bonuses in attempt to buy off worker’s revolutionary consciousness with material incentive. At the height of early January, 1967, the attack almost paralyzed entire Shanghai, where the city finds a shortage on coal that threatens city-wide power outage and water outage.

Under the leadership of the left line, spearheaded by Zhang Chunqiao and Wang Hongwen in Shanghai with many other revolutionary leaders, the workers started to take over the economy. In this process, they requested the party leaders they previously criticized to assume their work, yet these bourgeois figures, waiting to see the failure of the masses, rejected. The result was completely against their wishes. On January 12, revolutionary workers under the name Anti-economism Headquarter take over administration of maritime good transportation over Yangtze River; January 18, revolutionary workers from Yangpu Power Plant take over, and restored production in 18 hours. Workers across Shanghai, within a period of half a month, put an end to all the chaos created by economism plotted by the old Shanghai Party Committee. In these struggles, they come to a clear grasp of seizing the power from the capitalist roaders, and begin planning on seizing the political power in Shanghai.

The overtake in Shanghai, Beijing, and the formation of Revolutionary Committee in Heilongjiang, formed a concentrated attack on the bourgeois line. This attack concerted a storm, later know as the January Storm, against the bourgeois line. Under the inspiration of these three examples, revolutionary masses started to seizing political power from bourgeois figures in their locality. There are two important notes on the January Storm: first, the power seizure in the three cities are not spontaneous; rather, the revolutionary leaders in these localities are in line with the revolutionary headquarter in the Central, and exchanged information and received advice from Chairman Mao. The leadership of the left in the Central provided and reassured the direction of these power seizures. Second, Heilongjiang’s power seizure proposed the three-in-one model of Revolutionary Committee, which constructs the new power on the basis of revolutionary masses,

representatives from the PLA, and revolutionary cadres. The new power structure is constructed with incorporating the revolutionary movements from the overthrown structure, while bringing the revolutionary masses to the dictatorship. The Revolutionary Committee model resolved the question of how to facilitate the revolutionary unity among revolutionary elements under the goal of seizing power from the bourgeois figures in power. This model is introduced across the country by Chairman Mao later.

All the way until 1968, power seizure developed on an uneven basis according to the conditions in each different province and locality. We want to point out that, while the bourgeoisie is *defeated*, it is not *destroyed*. Not only themselves, the various forms of bourgeois ideas still prevail in some cases, doing actual disservice to the question of power. Immediately after January Storm, in localities where new power structure is established, there comes ultra-leftist attack. Taking the form of anarchism and factionalism, the ultra-leftist figures attempt to enact second power seizure and put themselves in charge. These attempts created not simply confusion among the revolutionary masses, but objectively disunity that replaces the revolutionary cause with a petty cause of one faction over another. What is worse, this infighting distanced the masses that are not yet convinced and engaged in the struggle, if not pushing them to the conservative side. This is the situation in Shanxi, Shandong, especially Wuhan during 1967-1968. The bourgeois figures took the chance and set up counter attack, benefiting from ultra-leftism to impose rightism. In Wuhan, the infighting between Workers Headquarter and Revolutionary Rebel Worker's General Headquarter provided the excuse for Chen Zaidao, a bourgeois figure in charge of Wuhan Military District to step in and forced Workers Headquarter to disband with mass arrest. Then, the bourgeois line throws a conservative mass organization in charge, use them as a tool to consolidate their control of power. We insist, the internal cause, the inability to find unity and factionalism is the main reason of the counterattack in the example of Wuhan. Revolutionaries must strive to apply "unite all who can be united" to avoid such tragedy.

Another important aspect is the role of army. In his thesis "People's War until communism", Chairman Gonzalo asserted the importance of arming the masses and prepare them for armed struggle against all forms of reactionaries. This echoes in comrade Jiang Qing's famous line Wen Gong Wu Wei, or "attack by pens and defense by weapons". The central question to power is the organized violence that guarantees it. Seeking to restore bourgeois power, the bourgeoisie always seek to seize the gun. In February 1967, several high-ranking cadres within the CPCh, all serving high military positions, launched attack on the revolutionary line in attempt to call off the GPCR. It is intriguing that these figures share a common military background. Meanwhile, Lin Biao clique used the dispatching of PLA to support power seizures and class struggle in localities to impose their rightist decisions, violently suppressing mass organizations, and put up subjects that are loyal to him. In place like Shandong, the two line headquartered in the military district. To construct the army under the firm leadership of the party, especially on increasing the ideological-political development of its apparatuses to maintain it as the best weapon to impose the left line, and defend and establish proletarian power is a key question to be resolved by the revolutionaries in applying the principle of militarization to the condition of each country.

In 1969, after three years of fierce and bloody struggle against the bourgeois line, the revolutionary masses, cadres, and PLA combatants received all-round education on Marxism; in the course of struggle, the revolutionary masses and cadres deepened their understanding on the construction of socialism, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the class struggle under socialism. The Party, after analyzing the lessons from New Democratic Revolution, Socialist Revolution, and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, defined Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought as a new and higher stage of Marxism. As Marxism in the era of the collapse of imperialism, and worldwide victory of socialism, Mao Zedong Thought encompassed Chairman Mao's contribution to the three component parts of Marxism. Cultural revolution is considered as the solution to eradicate all

bourgeois and old ideas and relations, and the principle that guides to the eventual victory of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie. However, while Chinese comrades contributed to the term, the definition is never complete in Chinese Revolution. Mao Zedong Thought is never systematically examined and listed in a manner like Stalin did to Lenin's contribution in *Foundations of Leninism*. It is not until Chairman Gonzalo and the First Congress of the PCP do communists and revolutionaries around the world see a complete definition of Maoism.

The Ninth Congress, while defeating Liu Shaoqi's bourgeois headquarter and line, also sees another yet hidden figure, Lin Biao, comes to power. Lin, despite struggling alongside the left against Liu and his company, has his own ambition in seizing power and bringing back capitalism with another line. During the first three years of the GPCR, Lin used his prestige and authority in the military to place his close allies to different military districts, and using such position to control newly formed Revolutionary Committees. In the Central, Lin and his company seized the Work Team of Central Military Commission, which functions as the head of military from 1967 to 1971. This position allows Lin to distort Chairman Mao's teaching and words to garner himself prestige, branding him as a "left" figure who should be the legitimate successor of Chairman Mao.

After the Ninth Congress, Lin Biao and his company use the connection they have to find possible allies within the Party. With Ye Qun, Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Qiu Huizuo and Li Zuopeng, Lin tries to rally a strong force and somewhat repeat what Liu did on the Seven Thousands Cadres Conference. Using the organizational structure of the military, Lin had conversation with heads of military districts, and won the support of a descent amount of them. They also approached many "old" cadres who are criticized and taken down in the power seizure process in 1967-1968, such as Chen Yi. They also find representatives within the Party like Chen Boda and Wang Dongxing. Although Lin rallied a descent force, he is concerned about the prestige of Chairman Mao. Consequently, he deliberately planned the attack on other revolutionary figures and cadres, mainly Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Kang Sheng.

At the Second Plenum of the Ninth Central Committee in 1970 at Lushan, Lin unleashed his attack. Before the Plenum, Lin discussed with his colleagues, making two directions for the struggle: one, to discuss the question of establishing national chairman of China (which is already discussed and denied at earlier politburo meeting); two, using the struggle around the first topic to target attack on Zhang Chunqiao. This direction is made for three reasons: first, to weaken the proletarian headquarter by attacking its leading figures; second, to establish Lin Biao as vice president, so to provide legal context for him succeeding power; third, it uses the prestige of Chairman Mao to provide cover (as they claim Chairman Mao should be the president). Lin's henchmen Ye Qun and Chen Boda relayed this plan to his close allies. As soon as the problem of setting president went public, it stimulates heated discussions. At regional discussion groups at the Plenum, Lin's company traffic the name of Chairman Mao, using his prestige to shut down all opposing voices, and hinting to other representatives that the objection really comes from Zhang and Jiang. Many "old" cadres use this chance to express their anger on revolutionaries, who criticized them and removed them in early struggles in the GPCR.

By the second day of the Plenum, Lin rallied an overwhelming support, and channeled the struggle onto Zhang Chunqiao. Zhang and Jiang reported to Chairman Mao, who at the time is not participating directly in the Plenum. In determination to go against the current, Chairman Mao intervened and ordered a stop to the discussion. In conversation with Lin's colleagues, he expressed strong attitude on saving Zhang Chunqiao, and revolutionary leaders they seek to attack. Chen Boda is removed from post for severe violation of discipline and spearheading bourgeois line, and later a campaign is launched against him with the goal of winning over elements deceived by Lin Biao, and exposing his loyal followers.

The Second Plenum of the Ninth Central Committee, coincidentally taking the same place as the Seven Thousands Cadres Conference, made the revolutionaries aware of the presence of Lin's clique, who, despite for all the disguises and sloganeering, is ultimately an emerging bourgeois line. At the same time, Lin Biao, realizing that it is impossible to seize power with a legal process, starts to prepare for a military coup. Lin uses his post to create a hidden layer of communication with military leads who are loyal to him, and use these resources to form a secret clique within the air force and navy directly under the command of his son, Lin Liguo. The Grand Fleet and the Small Fleet, two military sect directly under the command of Lin's closest allies, took up the task of drafting a plan for military coup. In their program, Lin attacked Chairman Mao as a dictator, using the vocabulary from Soviet social imperialism and US imperialism to attack the left.

As Lin stages his attack, the left works to win over the majority of the elements who are deceived by Lin, and follow his line. The Criticize Chen and Rectify the Method of Work Movement launched after the 1970 Lushan Plenum aims at educating these elements on Marxism, helping them to see their mistake and make criticism and self-criticism accordingly. As the Movement develops, the resisting attitude from Lin's close allies, namely Ye, Huang, Wu, Qiu, and Li, represented in their superficial self-criticism, and denial of organizational connection leading the left to realize that they are no longer salvageable. The left then moved to cripple their support among different locals. Three main methods are applied by the left, mainly Chairman Mao himself: first, circulate Chen Boda's material with comment to facilitate struggle and education about the bourgeois line; second, add figures from the left to organs manipulated by Lin Biao's clique; third, reorganizing Beijing Military District, removing elements loyal to Lin from it, to ensure that Lin cannot use his line to directly attack the Central. Chairman Mao also struggles first to ensure the firm control of the left in the Central, then Beijing, then to other locals. In 1971, he visited various provinces in the South, having direct conversations with lead in different military districts, winning a majority of them to neutral stands, if not to the left. Realizing his chance is flying away, Lin decided to launch the coup by attempting to directly assassinate Chairman Mao, yet he failed. Then, fearing the struggle to come, he fled from China, and died on the way.

The death of Lin Biao does not mean an end to the clique formed around him. Many members of his clique are high-ranking military officers. Chairman Mao and the left then waged a year of patient struggle, identifying and dealing with these figures within the Central and on local level. Realizing that the left is weak and does not have a firm control on the military, Chairman Mao repeatedly recommend the revolutionary leaders on local level to make good relations with the PLA, and train up militia. On the Central level, he also directed several revolutionary leaders, for example Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, to key positions within the CMC. At the same time, the left seeks to unite with and help former leaders who are stroke down during the early GPCR around the left line, meaning to use their talent to help strengthen the control of the left. This effort is fruitful, figures like Zhu De are brought up again, who used their prestige to help the left to wage struggle against remaining forces of Lin Biao's clique. However, some die-hard bourgeois figures, principally Deng Xiaoping, use this chance to disguise themselves. In his letter to Chairman Mao, Deng pretends that he has fully remolded, criticizing Lin in harsh terms while promising that he will never reverse the verdict on him and forever uphold the GPCR. What happened later proved that he is nothing but a miserable rat, who is determined to reverse the course and restore capitalism.

The struggle against Lin Biao's clique also sees a rise in rightist tendency within the Party. Zhou Enlai, in criticizing Lin Biao's line, erroneously conclude Lin as an ultra-left figure. The confusion led to him and other figures close to him pushing an eclectic line in liberating the "old" cadres. During this time, Zhou also made several right opportunist errors, with the main one in 1973. During a conversation with Nixon, Zhou and Ye Jianying show a compromising attitude to the US's offering of nuclear umbrella. In 1974, during the preparation of the Fourth National People's Congress, he engaged in sectarian acts, seeking to exclude prominent figures of the left such as

Zhang Chunqiao and Jiang Qing from assuming key posts. These repeated errors show a developing right opportunist tendencies on him. Zhou, albeit never participated in anti-party cliques, still played a negative role from 1973. However, when dealing with Zhou's error, the left in the Central also committed sectarian errors, seeking to combat sectarian behavior from the right with sectarian behavior from the left. At the same time, they overly relied on Chairman Mao's prestige and analysis in these struggles. Empirically taking the method they used at the Second Plenum of the Ninth Central Committee that evolves significantly around reporting to Chairman Mao and let him do the struggle, the four tries to do it again and again, reducing themselves as a soldier while forgetting that they need to grow as capable leader and leadership of the left. This highlights a lack of development which becomes Achilles' heel of the left.

As these struggles unfold, Deng utilized them to disguise himself with the goal of being readmitted to the Party. He criticized Zhou for his rightist tendency, to a degree even more serious than the criticism gave by the left. With all these covers, he deceived the left, and is liberated in 1973 at the Tenth Congress. As soon as he gets back to the post, he starts staging his attack. Immediately after his return, he starts seeking allies from the liberated "old" cadres and a number of centrists and rightists within the Party. Using friendship and work as covers, he formed a secret clique out of sight. By the end of 1974, Deng staged a plan, using rectification movement as the tool to reverse the conclusion reached in previous line struggles. Distorting the banner of "grasp revolution, promote production", Deng started a massive campaign in restoring "old" cadres without questioning their ideological-political rectification, if not reversing proletarian standard to bourgeois standard, and disqualifying new cadres who come from the revolutionary masses. Under the cover of party positions, Deng plotted with figures like Ye Jianying and Li Xiannian to restore their control on key positions and disrupt the unity formed at the Tenth Congress. They provide information to one another in violation to the organizational structure, and use secretive methods to try to sway leaders in the Central and different locals to their side. At the same time, they talk to centrists like Ji Dengkui and Hua Guofeng, rallying them under the common goal of struggling against the left, primarily their leading figures: Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Wang Hongwen.

We believe it is important that all revolutionaries study Deng Xiaoping as an example of a die-hard revisionist and reactionary. He is a perfect example of these bourgeois figures, who, in order to restore capitalism, must first restore themselves to power with all means necessary. They do not have a single sense of party discipline and communist spirit, and would love to fake condemning themselves to regain power. We reiterate Chairman Mao, who emphasized the Marxist principle that the revolutionary practice is the sole criterion of truth; the figurehead of the bourgeois line and revisionist trends must be tested in prolonged period of work among the masses, and their loyalty to the cause examined in both their word and deed, mainly the deed.

At the same time, among the left rises a new danger of rightism. By 1975, a right opportunist, legalist (*he fa zhu yi*) line rises within the left. Raising the experience of the previous struggles to an absolute level, they practiced empiricism and concluded that the main form of struggle against the bourgeoisie is the legal struggle that happen within the party and different levels of the state apparatus. They fall into bourgeois legalism and subjugating the lower body completely to the upper body. It violates the teaching of Chairman Mao. As Wang Hongwen said three days before the coup on October 6, 1976, "what should you do if the Central become revisionist? Strike them down!" Here, the question of arm is the primary question which the opportunist failed to grasp, and eventually lead to the capitalist restoration. They do not see the necessity of struggle with all means to uphold and impose a correct political line. Instead, with the loss of their leader to the revisionists, they are frightened by their class enemy, and choose to surrender than to fight.

Noticing the tendency Deng slowly demonstrates after his restoration to position, Chairman Mao

takes steps to expose Deng his true color, and combat him when he reveals himself. In early 1975, Deng and his crew started a rectification campaign that claims to target factionalism at local level. Yet in reality, they focus their attack on revolutionary cadres, especially new cadres who actively participated in the rebellion against local bourgeois figures in power in early GPCR. They tried to “reverse the verdict”, liberating “old” cadres who are in their favor, while persecuting and disciplining revolutionary cadres in attempt to reinstall bourgeois figures at local level. In Zhejiang province, they arrested the prominent revolutionary leader Zhang Yongsheng; in Henan province, they launched a massive investigation campaign on new party members and cadres who are promoted during GPCR. They dispatched work teams to persecute revolutionary cadres in People’s Communes, and demoting them from leadership because they are not “professional”. Calling the new cadres “naive” and “young”, what they actually say is that they do not trust the masses. They are afraid of the masses, particularly that the masses who study and apply Marxism and rebelled against revisionism.

The entire attack launched by Deng and his Co is wrapped under the slogan “taking three directives as the key”. The slogan comes out as a distortion of a directive issued by Chairman Mao on February 1975, which emphasizes the importance of grasping the necessity of consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat, and under its framework develop national economy and foster stability. Deng, however, sees the three parts as equal, while making the need of consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat a mere theoretical question. In practice, Deng diminishes the role of “warn against and oppose revisionism”, while lifting up the latter two “develop the national economy” and “emphasis on stability and unity”. He covers these slogans carefully with Chairman Mao’s speech and directive to sell the interest of the bourgeois line. In the field of research and education, he uses this slogan to pave the way of attacking revolutionaries in these fields, and promoting white-expert figure. In education in particular, Deng and his Co try to restore a strict score system which seeks to qualify students with heavy tests and exams, completely negating the need of training the students up in class struggle and production. In the field of economy, Deng promotes a capitulationist line which relies on foreign expert and trade for industrial development, and asks enterprises to take profit as the lead in its planning. This line is in contradiction to Chairman Mao’s line of self-reliance. He revitalizes material incentive and disguised it in the form of “bonus” to workers who show enthusiasm and initiatives, in essence trying to corrupt them and turn them into pawns of the bourgeois line.

Deng did not limit his attack to China along. Internationally, he joined the chorus of revisionists and imperialists, pushing for a re-branded version of Wang Jiaxiang’s rightist line in foreign affairs. He promotes a line that seeks peace with imperialists and revisionists, primarily US imperialism and Soviet social-imperialism with the fabricated fear of a world nuclear war. Meanwhile, he cuts the support to fraternal countries like Albania and Vietnam, and reduces aids to various parties in the Southeast Asia. This line of “Three Surrender, One Extinguishing” seeks to surrender proletarian revolution to some subjective fear of the world reactionary force, and in practice it only serves the rightist and revisionist to advance their attack on China’s leading position as the red base of world revolutionary camp.

To draw attention to this emerging bourgeois line, Chairman Mao first deployed the campaign to comment *Water Margin*. Using the book as an example of hidden reactionary figure seizes power and capitulates, he calls attention on the danger of forgetting about bourgeois figures at the moment, who are already staging attack; at the same time, this campaign forces Deng and his Co to further action, through which they will better expose themselves. In reaction to it, Deng tries to make the campaign to criticize *Water Margin* purely theoretical, saying it is meaningful only to the entire historical process of socialism, but not the present moment. The way he deflects the attack recalls us how Peng Zhen tried to make the criticism of *Hai Rui Dismissed from Office* purely historical in 1965. The revolutionary cadres and masses, under Chairman Mao’s directive issued in February

1975 in studying Marxist theory, partook in the struggle on commenting *Water Margin*. As the struggle develops, many of them developed understanding about inner-party bourgeoisie and class struggle under socialism. The campaign to comment *Water Margin* trained the theoretical skill of many young revolutionaries, while preparing them against a rising bourgeois line.

At the same time, Deng and his Co hurried in rallying all forces possible on their side to struggle against the left. We have mentioned before that Deng attacks revolutionary cadres at local level. On top of this, they also try to secretly form alliance with “old” cadres who oppose to the left in the party, place their men in charge of local militia, and actively disrupt the unity around the left line within the army, and win over military district leader. They did these in a completely conspiring way, using spare time between meetings as cover to secretly discuss political matter, exchange beliefs and stands, and align on how they go with certain things. As one example, at the Enlarged Meeting of the Military Commission in 1975, Deng and Ye used the meeting as a cover to secretly talk to military district’s first in command and high-ranking military officers, in an attempt to win them over. In this manner, Deng rallied Ye Jianying and Xu Shiyu in the army, and drew closer relations to Hua Guofeng and like in the party. At all level, Deng tries to find cadres who can be swayed to his side, by the virtue of bourgeois class stand or by material incentives. They plot to advance the rightist position in economy, such as the agricultural debate on collectivization and mechanization, where Deng and Hua pushed for mechanization without collectivization. In the army, they conspire to put people they trust in charge, seeking to reduce the revolutionary leadership in the army and strengthen their own bourgeois leadership over it.

The struggle breaks out in the field of education and scientific research. As early as in March, 1975, Deng ordered his henchman Zhou Rongxin to struggle against “Chaoyang Experience”. Zhou then spearheaded the attack on it, as to open the struggle against education revolution that orients education around production, class struggle, and scientific research, and among the three mainly class struggle. By July, Zhou starts to distort Chairman Mao’s words to reinstate a sophisticated, theory-centered education. He called revolutionary doing things in metaphysical manner, yet he raises a program of returning white-experts to the absolute dominance in the education system. Meanwhile, in Ministry of Aerospace Industry, Zhang Aiping launches attack on the revolutionaries and young researchers, accusing them of factionalism and pushing them to the side. This all-round attack is resisted by revolutionaries. Mao Yuanxin in Liaoning reported to Chairman Mao that locally there erupts great debates around the line pushed by Zhou Rongxin, where many recognize his line as a bourgeois line that attempts to reverse the outcome of education revolution. In Beijing, Zhou’s line is boycotted and criticized by many students and faculties in Tsinghua University and Peking University. By November 1975, the struggle around education revolution has developed in favor of the revolutionary. In criticizing Zhou Rongxin, the revolutionaries pointed at his backstage: Deng Xiaoping.

In the politburo, Chairman Mao still struggles to help Deng Xiaoping to rectify his error. In November 1975, Chairman Mao proposed that the politburo should have a meeting to draft up a resolution to affirm the outcome of GPCR, and Deng should host it. On the meeting on November 20, Deng, however, rejects this proposal with the excuse that he does not know well of the situation. His rejection shows his reserve to GPCR. Considering what he has done, this rejection shows a fundamental difference in world outlook and in line, where Deng does not belong to the proletarian headquarter. To unite the majority within the Party to combat this new rightist tendency, particularly older cadres, Chairman Mao ordered discussion in all leading bodies and central organs of the Party, with the goal of informing cadres of the emerging bourgeois line, and help them to stand with the revolutionary line to combat the bourgeois line. On January 1, 1976, *People’s Daily*, *Hongqi* magazine, and *People’s Liberation Army Daily* all released op-ed condemning Deng’s “three directives”. The op-eds call attention to class struggle, and criticized Deng as the capitalist roader who “does not regret nor change” while not naming him directly. The campaign of

“Criticizing Deng Xiaoping, Oppose Right Deviation Tendencies” begins.

Although the situation has turned away in their favor, Deng and his company did not drop their weapon. Rather, while making self-criticisms in the form to get them away from the heat, they keep staging and planning for anti-party actions in secret. They used Chairman Mao and the left’s will to unite with the mistaken comrades and rectify their error to create ground for their own maneuvering, aiming at reserving their force to launch a concerted attack to seize back some power. The opportunity came with the passing away of Zhou Enlai. After the Tenth Congress, Zhou supported the work of Deng, and had several struggle with revolutionaries. Deng and his company uses Zhou’s prestige among the masses to instigate a surprise attack on Wang, Zhang, Jiang and Yao, whose real target is Chairman Mao. They directly staged and developed the April 5 Tiananmen Square Incident, spreading counterrevolutionary phrases such as calling Chairman Mao a feudal emperor and Jiang Qing as Wu-Zetian-like figure, accusing the Party being poisoned by factionalism. Their companies within the Party also calls for an armed repression of the crowd, trying to antagonize the Party against the masses.

The plan, however, did not work out. Rather, Tiananmen Square Incident exposed the secret gang of Deng Xiaoping, and himself as another Chinese Khrushchev. In the investigation following the Incident, Deng is removed from all positions, and denounced publicly. The Party started a campaign to rectify and isolate elements who followed Deng’s line. The bourgeois line was forced to retreat, with Deng Xiaoping, Li Xiannian, Ye Jianying either removed or suspended from their work. However, with the secret clique they formed, they still manipulate affairs in the Party. They maintained communication with figures like Yang Chengwu and Wang Dongxing who are still in power, and served as their counselor. From May 1976 to the coup, Deng and Ye worked behind the stage to block the revolutionary from imposing the left line in the PLA and furthering it in the Party. At the same time, they act in defiance to all disciplines and procedures to secure their control of a section of the army to launch the coup.

Following the development of the campaign of “Criticize Deng Xiaoping, Oppose Right Deviation Tendencies”, Hua Guofeng rose to power. Hua is an economist figure who does not grasp politics, not to mention about line struggle. However, he disguised himself well in the struggle against Deng, siding with the revolutionaries and actively participated in the defeat of Tiananmen Square Incident. Considering the need for a figure that can be recognized by both the left and right within the Party, and to unite under the direction of “Criticize Deng, Oppose Right Deviation Tendencies”, Chairman Mao considered him a figure to enhance unity, just as the role of Zhang Wentian after Zunyi Conference. Yet Hua has his personal ambition. In 1975 he corresponds to the rectification Deng launched, purging revolutionary cadres who do not agree with him and pushing for an expert line in agricultural production. After he assumed position, he pursued for the position of chairman. In the campaign of “Criticize Deng”, he also used his power to cover up rightist errors he and his company made. After Chairman Mao passed away, Hua seeks secret political alliance from the politburo and the army, conspiring with people like Li Xiannian, Wang Dongxing, Ye Jianying and Chen Yun. They seek a cliquist way to resolve the political division between them and the left – a coup, and nothing more.

It is important to notice that “Criticize Deng, Oppose Right Deviation Tendencies” reached noticeable victory in various provinces (for example, Shanghai, Liaoning, Beijing, etc). However, the successful development in several provinces concealed an incorrect view to the line struggle. There arises an understanding that line struggle (as the recent example against Deng Xiaoping shows) can fully be resolved within the state apparatuses through its legal processes. Therefore, only revolutionary in local Revolutionary Committee and legal mass movement is needed; the question of power, and of arm is *not important*. One example of such view is Wuhan, where revolutionaries organized within and without the Revolutionary Committee, but paid little to none

attention to the militia and the PLA. One faction of them went to organize a movement outside of the Party and the Revolutionary Committee, demanding to play the role of supervising the work and pushing for change as masses. This line is right opportunist in essence, using legal struggle to replace the need for seizing arm in the hand of the left, thus moving away from the defense of power as Chairman Mao famously taught us that “power comes out of the barrel of a gun”.

What are the main reasons leading to the coup of October 6, 1976? We conclude there are three. First, the betrayal of the centrist, headed by Hua Guofeng, Ji Dengkui, and Chen Yonggui, who turned against the teaching of Chairman Mao, defied organizational principles, and formed an anti-party clique in collaboration with the rightists. The act they committed shows that they have degenerated into bourgeois figures in power, who shamefully advanced the interest of the bourgeoisie. Second, the sabotage of the rightist hiding in the revolutionary camp. These sabotages are mainly on creating confusion among the left after the coup, and sabotaging the line of communication between revolutionaries to the army. As a result, these hidden figures disarmed the left from physical means to fight back. Third, the right opportunist line among the left. This is the principal reason, and indeed the internal cause through which the revisionists can defeat the formation of the left.

The leader of the right legalist line, like Ma Tianshui and Xu Jingxian, spread capitulationist line among the left. Ma and Xu, after being summoned by the revisionists to Beijing after the coup, are convinced that they are not bourgeois figures, and called off armed uprising in Shanghai after returning. It is important to note that, while revolutionaries prepared for an armed uprising, their plan is predominately defensive, and a pessimistic attitude dominated the entire planning session. At the same time, various other localities, such as Yunnan and Hubei practiced “waitism”, basically waiting for Shanghai to act first so they can follow, while Liaoning stays at rest, thinking they have Chen Xilian (who supported the coup) to cover for them. They represent a lazy position, a running away from active line struggle and class struggle, giving up on the position and duty of communists. The right indeed act to disarm the left, and to take away physical weapon from them; yet the right opportunists disarmed the left their mental weapon, preached a non-Marxist line, and instructed them to wait for the their death to knock on the door.

The right opportunist line, while capitulating the proletarian power to the revisionists, is not unchallenged. A left line exists, which upholds the need of doing armed struggle. After the Oct 6 coup, there are also localities who identified the revisionist, reactionary coup, and immediately move to prepare armed struggle to reascending Jinggang Mountains. We have briefly mentioned Shanghai, and in Yunnan, Guizhou, Fujian, Sichuan, and many other provinces, there are revolutionaries who actually took the gun and engaged in armed struggle. In Guizhou, the vice chair of Guizhou Revolutionary Committee, Kang Yanzhong, propagated among the left immediately after the Oct 6 coup that they must take up arm to defeat the rightist coup. By late November, Kang and a small force organized around him went underground and planning to move to the countryside. They propose a combined plan of mobilizing the peasants and encircling the city and selective annihilation of prominent revisionist figures. However, due to the lack of mass base (we need to know, these revolutionaries also did not went out and do public propaganda), their force shattered, and Kang was arrested early December of 1976. In Fujian, an organization called Communist Party of China (Workers and Peasants Liberation Army) exists at least from 1976 to 1978. They engaged in guerrilla warfare in the hilly areas of Fujian, establishing guerrilla zones, and engaged in battle with the revisionist-controlled army.

Simultaneously, there rises many organizations and individuals who tried to reconstitute the Communist Party of China. There exists a dozen of organization with various combination of the name “Communist Party of China” and “Marxist-Leninist”; in Henan, a group existed from 1978 to 1980, which seeks to launch armed struggle via fundraising and raiding of arsenal. In Yunnan and

Sichuan, there are recorded prisoners who post and spread anti-revisionist slogans that attack Hua Guofeng and the coup, and was executed by the revisionists. These organizations, while having their own limitations and errors, upheld the left line after the Oct 6 coup, and truly practiced Chairman Mao's revolutionary line to their last breath. We must remember, the class is always fighting, organizing, and reorganizing. The coup is but a bend in the road, it did not eliminate the proletariat, nor its revolutionary thought. One day, the struggle with blood and tear will give birth to an entire generation of revolutionaries, who shall uphold the banner of Chairman Mao, and bring proletarian power back to the land.

III. Synthesis

What are the key lessons we should learn from the GPCR? Regarding the GPCR itself, we summarized the below points. First, cultural revolution is the continuation of revolution under socialism that aims at overthrowing the bourgeoisie in all fields to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat in the incessant march towards communism. As the third and higher stage of Marxism, Maoism answers to the question of the transformation from socialism to communism with cultural revolution. Second, the leadership of the correct ideological-political line is the key to everything. Such leadership is manifested in great leadership, as Chairman Mao's role to Chinese Revolution. As Chairman Mao said, with a correct line everything can come out of it. This line is constantly developed and defended in struggle against incorrect lines, which under socialism represents the interest of the bourgeoisie. Third, power, proletarian power exercised by the revolutionary masses under the leadership of the communist party is the key to carry out all-round dictatorship on the bourgeoisie. The consolidation of the proletarian power must incorporate constant process of exposing and removing those who degenerated, and incorporating the enthusiastic and conscious elements from the masses. Fourth, the question of arm is the principal question to whether or not the proletariat can maintain its power. Without the arming of the revolutionary masses, united under the revolutionary line and equipped with Marxism, the dictatorship of the proletariat is nothing but an empty term.

There are also few points that worth elaboration on for their importance to our grasp of Maoism, and to the revolutionaries waging struggle in each country. First, militarization of the party as the foundation to the continuation of revolution under socialism. During the GPCR, bourgeois figures applied different methods to seize power, and among these methods we stress the use of reactionary uprising, riot, and possible civil war. These danger exists under socialism, as the highest class antagonism amid the struggle between the capitalist and socialist road. Even after the success of world proletarian revolution on the worldwide scale, there still exists the possibility of capitalist restoration in one country, who might degenerate into social imperialism and serve as the global headquarter of the bourgeoisie. The main form the revolutionaries must uphold, as the thesis "People's War until communism" pointed out, is the application of revolutionary violence and revolutionary war to oppose counterrevolutionary violence and counterrevolutionary war. The failure of the left in responding to the counterrevolutionary coup in October 6, 1976 is exactly a counterexample of this point.

Second, in the development of world proletarian revolution, we should be aware of the act of "carrying the red banner to oppose the red banner". As revisionists repeatedly conceal their action with revolutionary terms, we should note, that in the process of decomposition of imperialism, imperialists will study the experience of their revisionist friends, and try to disguise themselves all to extend their life. We must examine primarily the concrete actions with Maoism, expose the fake "Marxists" whose doing is only in service to capitalism-imperialism. The defeat of revisionism is a critical landmark in the process of uniting and arousing the masses to wage revolution in each country and also worldwide.

Third, factionalism as a trend of bourgeois thinking among the revolutionary masses is only beneficial to the interest of the bourgeoisie. In the GPCR, factional infighting becomes the source of revisionist coming to power. We must reject factionalism in all circumstances, firmly uphold the left line, and practice the formula “unity-struggle-unity” to unite the broad masses around the left line in the struggle to transform the world. At the same time, we must acknowledge the right also actively plot for the emergence of factionalism and division among the masses, as a method to divide and rule. Among revolutionaries, we must firmly unite on the principal task of reconstituting the communist party in their country, and concretely apply Maoism to the condition of one country to launch and develop people’s war, establish new power (and in imperialist countries, proletarian power), and carry out cultural revolutions until communism. We will struggle for the correct line and understanding of concrete conditions, and such struggle is essential to the prevailing of the revolutionary line; but in these struggles, we must always evaluate the character of the struggle, recognize whether the contradiction is between people or with enemy, and make the form of struggle accordingly.

Fourth, recognize “left” and right opportunism as the two side of the same coin. When the right is fought, the “left” emerges. In Chinese Revolution, one example is the struggle against subjectivism, wherever empiricism is combated, dogmatism takes the chance to manifest itself. We must take consideration of Chairman Mao’s teaching, that one incorrect tendency conceals another incorrect tendency [and allowing it to develop unnoticed]. As revolutionaries, we must pay close attention to the politics in our organization, struggle against the main form of opportunism danger, while be aware of the lesser ones. In the process of combating “left” and right opportunism, we continuously educate ourselves and the masses about Marxism, grasping this ideological weapon of our class to transform the world.

Fifth, recognize the uneven development of revolutionary situations. This is both applicable to the world level and the level of one country. To resolve the uneven development, it is the duty of revolutionaries to develop well the work in their locality, with the consideration of the country/world as a whole. We are revolutionaries in service to world proletarian revolution, and we cannot restrain ourselves to the border of one country. Just as the leading role of the CPCh in resolving the uneven situation of power seizure, it is necessary to have such organization on the international level. We pay our respects to the International Communist League, whose members actively struggles to unite the revolutionary force under the banner of Maoism.

Long Live the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution!
Unite under Maoism!
Reconstitute the Communist Party of USA!

Glossary of Translated Terms:

Original Name – Pinyin – Translated Name (Abbreviation)

中国共产党 – Zhong guo gong chan dang – Communist Party of China (CPCh)

无产阶级文化大革命 – Wu chan jie ji wen hua da ge ming – Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR)

中央文革小组 – Zhong yang wen ge xiao zu – Central Cultural Revolution Group (CCRG)

中央军委 – Zhong yang jun wei – Central Military Commission (CMC)

军委办事组 – Jun wei ban shi zu – Military Commission Work Group

三家村札记 – San jia cun zha ji – Sanjiacun Notes

人民武装部 – Ren min wu zhuang bu – Department of People's Armed Forces (DPAF)

人民解放军 – Ren min jie fang jun – People's Liberation Army (PLA)

军区 – Jun qu – Military District

党委 – Dang wei – Party Committee

三自一包 – San zi yi bao – “Three Freedom, One Fix” (more plots for private use, more free markets, more enterprises with sole responsibility for their own profit or loss, and fixing output quotas on a household basis)

大舰队 – Da jian dui – The Grand Fleet

小舰队 – Xiao jian dui – The Small Fleet

三降一灭 – San xiang yi mie – “Three Surrender, One Extinguishing” (Surrender to imperialism, surrender to revisionism, surrender to reactionary, and extinguish national liberation struggle and revolution around the world)

朝阳经验 – Chao yang jing yan – “Chaoyang Experience” is the method first applied by revolutionaries at Chaoyang Agricultural Institute. The Experience comes up with working-class- and peasant-oriented policies, combining education and research with production. It focuses on recruiting from the lower-middle peasants, and orienting education around the three great struggles.